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Abstract 
In earlier work, we introduced flexible infer­
ence and decision-theoretic metareasoning to 
address the intractability of normative infer­
ence. Here, rather than pursuing the task of 
computing beliefs and actions with decision 
models composed of distinctions about uncer­
tain events, we examine methods for inferring 
beliefs about mathematical truth before an 
automated theorem prover completes a proof. 
We employ a Bayesian analysis to update be­
lief in truth, given theorem-proving progress, 
and show how decision-theoretic methods can 
be used to determine the value of continuing 
to deliberate versus taking immediate action 
in time-critical situations. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Theorem proving is frequently perceived as a logi­
cal, deterministic endeavor. However, uncertainty of­
ten plays a critical role in theorem proving and other 
mathematical pursuits. The mathematician George 
Polya emphasized the importance of plausible reason­
ing for guiding the intuitions and effort of mathemati­
cians. In particular, he discussed the important role 
of analogy and uncertainty during mathematical theo­
rem proving [Polya, 1954a, Polya, 1954b). Conjectures 
about mathematical truth often draw upon existing 
proofs of related concepts and the results of inductive 
reasoning. As an example, logical knowledge and in­
ductive evidence strongly bolstered the beliefs of many 
mathematicians about the truth of Fermat's last theo­
rem before the recently developed proof of the theorem 
became available [van der Poorten, 1995b]. van der 
Poorten has commented on the importance of induc­
tion and intuition in belief about mathematical truth 
with regard to conjectures about the quantity of reg­
ular primes [van der Poorten, 1995a): 
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But even now, we still cannot prove that 
there are infinitely many regular primes. 
Sure we 'know' from experiment-extensive 
computation, and from heuristics-the feel­
ing in our stomachs ... 
We will formalize aspects of plausible reasoning in 
mathematics with an analysis of uncertain beliefs dur­
ing theorem proving under limited computational re­
sources. Specifically, we present a Bayesian analysis of 
the truth of a propositional claim, based on informa­
tion about the size of the search space and progress 
towards a goal during theorem-proving. We show how 
decision-theoretic reasoning and metareasoning can be 
used to make decisions about the best actions to take, 
and about the duration of deliberation before taking 
action with a partial result. We characterize the ex­
pected value of computation for a theorem prover, al­
lowing decision-making systems to determine how long 
to perform inference in a time-critical setting. Before 
delving into theorem proving, we will review briefly 
earlier work on rational action under limited resources, 
that has taken advantage of the use of flexible in­
ference procedures and decision-theoretic metareason­
ing [Horvitz, 1987, Horvitz et al., 1989). The previous 
work targeted problems with the ideal control of infer­
ence and representation with belief networks and in­
fluence diagrams in time-critical contexts. This work 
extends decision-theoretic reasoning and metareason­
ing under limited resources by highlighting the salience 
of uncertainty in the realm of theorem proving. 
2 DECISION-THEORETIC 
METAREASONING 
We are typically uncertain about the outcome of com­
plex computational processes. Nevertheless, we can 
often characterize the results of computation with ab­
stract descriptions of expected output. For example, 
we may be able to define attributes of quality and pre­
dict how these various dimensions will be refined with 
the allocation of resources. In reasoning about the 
quantity of time and memory to allocate to the refine-
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Figure 1: Early demonstrations of flexible computa­
tion with sorting algorithms. (a) Comparison of the 
utility of partial results generated by shellsort, selec­
tion sort, and less flexible heapsort algorithms. (b) 
Graph highlighting multiple attributes of value in a 
partial result of sorting. (c) Graphical representa­
tion of partial results during refinement of shellsort 
(lower sequence) and selection sort generated by the 
Protos/ Algo system. 
ment of partial results, we must often explicitly con­
sider the uncertainty about the results of computation. 
The expected value of computation (EVC) is the dif­
ference between the expected utility of employing the 
current result immediately and the expected utility of 
the result obtained after allocating additional compu­
tational resources [Horvitz, 1988, Russell, 1990]. The 
net EVC (NEVC) is the difference in expected utility, 
including the cost associated with delayed action. 
Flexible computation procedures are algorithms that 
provide continuous refinement of attributes of a 
computed result, given increasing allocation of one 
or more classes of computational resources (see 
[Dean and Wellman, 1991] and [Horvitz, 1987] for re­
views of temporally flexible algorithms). Resources 
can include time and memory. Another desirable 
property of flexible methods for computing under 
varying resources is convergence on the ideal re­
sult with some finite or infinite quantity compu­
tational resources. This property allows reason­
ing systems to converge on ideal results with in­
creasing amounts of computation. Convergence can 
be important in making arguments about bounded 
optimality--optimization of problem solving and ac­
tion given the expected challenges and costs of compu­
tation (for general discussions of bounded optimality 
and rationality, see [Horvitz, 1987], [Doyle, 1990], and 
[Russell et al., 1993]). Dean and Boddy introduced 
the term anytime algorithms to describe flexible com­
putation for incrementally refining the quality of plans 
generated by a planner [Dean and Boddy, 1988]. 
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In brief, a flexible algorithm transforms a current prob­
lem instance I into a partial result 1r(I), consuming 
computational resource r. We often can decompose 
the comprehensive utility of a partial result into the 
inference-related costs, u;,  and the object-level value, 
u0, of the result. The NEVC of allocating a quantity of 
resource r to a flexible strategy S; to refine a problem 
instance I is, 
NEVC(Si, I, r) r Uo(7r(I)) X p( 7r(I) IS;, I, r)  }, (I) 
-uo(I)- Ui(r) (1) 
The current problem instance I may be a partial re­
sult 1r0 (I), computed earlier by a flexible procedure 
with some prior allocation of resource. We may be 
uncertain about the multiple attributes or dimensions 
of value in a result, and about the utility functions U0 
and Ui used to map object-level utility to attributes 
of partial results, and disutility to allocated resources. 
To handle such cases, we can generalize Equation 1 by 
summing over the uncertainty associated with utility 
assignments and uncertainty over different attributes 
of partial results. 
We can employ EVC analyses to make decisions 
about the best flexible algorithms to apply and the 
length of time to apply the algorithms [Horvitz, 1988, 
Boddy and Dean, 1989]. Methods for handling such 
prototypical cost contexts as deadlines, uncertain 
deadlines, and general urgency are described in 
[Horvitz, 1988]. In general, real-time inference 
and information gathering for metareasoning must 
be tractable or compiled into tractable procedures 
through offline analysis [Horvitz, 1989]. Researchers 
typically have made greedy, myopic assumptions to 
keep metareasoning about ideal deliberation plans 
tractable. 
3 RELATED WORK ON BELIEFS 
AND LIMITED RESOURCES 
We shall focus on methods for controlling delibera­
tion in a theorem prover by analyzing the dynamic 
changes in beliefs about truth with deliberation. In re­
lated work on computation under bounded resources, 
decision-theoretic methods have been used to reason 
about probability and action, and to determine ideal 
deliberation [Horvitz et al., 1989]. Research on the 
Protos project at Stanford focused specifically on the 
control of probabilistic and decision-theoretic infer­
ence in belief networks and influence diagrams via 
the use of tractable, approximate decision-theoretic 
metareasoning. The Protos system has served as 
an example of reflective decision-analytic reasoning­
decision-theoretic reasoning that includes the costs of 
reasoning in computing optimal actions [Good, 1952, 
Horvitz, 1990]. In this work, a partial result is a 
second-order probability distribution over future prob-
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Figure 2: Decision-theoretic metareasoning about flex­
ible probabilistic inference for a time-critical medical 
decision problem. Graph on left displays the conver­
gence of bounds on probability with computation, the 
changing decision threshold, and ideal time to act. 
Larger graph shows Protos' explanation of partial re­
sult at time of action, including bounds on a critical 
probability and losses based in delay. 
abilities or utilities. Protos applies flexible prob­
abilistic inference to tighten the upper and lower 
bounds of probabilities that are required in time­
critical decision problems. Sample problems were 
drawn from emergency and intensive-care medicine 
[Horvitz and Rutledge, 1991]. The system continues 
to monitor the EVC of decision-theoretic inference 
based on the state of the decision problem and meta­
knowledge, obtained via analysis of performance of the 
inference algorithm, about the expected refinement of 
partial results with additional computation. When the 
net EVC becomes nonpositive, deliberation ceases and 
action is taken in the world. Figure 2 shows instru­
mentation output by Protos, including convergence 
of bounds on a probability with computation, time­
dependent changes in utilities and decision thresholds, 
and graphical explanation of the best decision. 
Other research on the development of flexible 
methods for computing beliefs under varying re­
sources includes work on anytime probabilistic logic 
[Frisch and Haddawy, 1995] and on flexible decision 
making with a probabilistic database [Pittarelli, 1994]. 
In these analyses, incremental-refinement methods are 
presented that allow the number of sentences about be­
liefs and action to be manipulated, inducing tradeoff's 
in precision and computation that provide opportuni­
ties for control. 
4 THEOREM-PROVING 
METHODOLOGIES 
Let us now delve into the realm of theorem proving 
under bounded resources. We shall apply methods 
analogous to the previous work on beliefs and actions 
under bounded resources; specifically, we shall identify 
flexible procedures and partial results for refining be­
lief in mathematical truth and for controlling theorem­
proving deliberation. In the case of theorem proving, 
we are interested in whether a formula or a group of 
formulae (the conclusion) is implied by another set of 
formulae (the premises). Automated theorem provers 
compute the answer to such questions. 
An infinite number of theorems can be deduced from 
the premises and logical tautologies. Thus, it is im­
practical to generate the conclusion from the premises 
through repeated application of valid rules of infer­
ence. An effective strategy is to show that a contra­
diction is implied by the conjunction of the premises, 
P, with the negation of the conclusion, -.C. If a con­
tradiction is found, then the conclusion must follow 
from the premises. If the premises themselves are in­
consistent, then any set of formulae will follow. 
Generative approaches to theorem proving, such as 
resolution refutation, do not provide indications how 
close the algorithm is to termination. The size of the 
theorem set at any given stage does not give us use­
ful information about the likelihood that the set itself 
is consistent. However, other methods provide better 
handles into solution progress. We have studied a class 
of propositional theorem provers which implement the 
matrix method [Bibel, 1987]. The matrix method of 
theorem proving structures the task of checking the 
consistency of a set of statements as a search through 
a space of truth assignments. The matrix method has 
properties that make possible the gathering of infor­
mation about the expected distance to a proof's com­
pletion. 
The matrix method works to prove inconsistency by 
searching for a truth assignment which satisfies the 
clauses in ( P 1\ -.C). If the search for a truth as­
signment fails, then the conclusion is entailed by the 
premises. The process is as follows: First, the conjunc­
tion of all formulae in the set (P 1\ -.C) is translated 
into conjunctive normal form. This results in a set of 
disjunctions or clauses, C1, C2, . • .  , Cn, which are im­
plicitly conjoined. A path x, through this set of clauses, 
is a set of ground literals, £1, ... , Ln, where each L; 
occurs in the disjunction C;. Thus, L;, 1 :::; i :::; n, is 
either a proposition P or its negation. A path is said 
to be open iff L; ::/= -.Lj, for all 1 :::; i, j :::; n. A path is 
closed iff L; = -.Lj for some i, j 1 :::; i, j :::; n. A truth 
assignment v can satisfy all literals in a path x iff x is 
open. Since the set of formulae ( P 1\ -.C) is logically 
equivalent to the set of clauses C1, C2, . . .  , Cn, a truth 
assignment exists that satisfies ( P 1\ -.C) iff an open 
path exists through the clauses. 
The search for an open path in the matrix method 
can be implemented as a depth-first search through a 
tree in which the literals of the first disjunct are the 
children of the root node, and all nodes at any given 
level have the literals of the next disjunct as their chil­
dren. The search down any given subpath terminates 
whenever a contradiction is found (i.e., when a syn­
tactic comparison shows that both a proposition and 
its negation occur on the current subpath), and all 
paths extending from this subpath are also discarded, 
since they will necessarily be contradictory as well. 
The conclusion must follow from the premises if no 
truth assignment can be found, equivalent to closing 
all paths. The matrix-method theorem-proving proce­
dure must consider a search space of paths bounded 
by the number of literals raised to the power of the 
number of clauses. For example, in a matrix with n 
clauses, where each is a disjunction of m literals, there 
are mn possible paths through the matrix. 
5 PROBABILITY AND PROOF 
What is the link between theorem proving and prob­
ability? Theorem proving with the matrix method in­
volves checking whether each of the 2k possible truth 
assignments for the set of literals appearing in the 
problem satisfies the members of (P 1\ •C). With 
matrix theorem proving, the search space that is tra­
versed in practice is not isomorphic to the space of 
possible valuations or models. However, there is a cor­
respondence between the syntactic search for an open 
path and the semantic search through a space of pos­
sible propositional truth assignments. Each subpath x 
through clauses C1, C2, ... , Cn, corresponds to the in­
tersection of the class of truth assignments v in which 
v(P) =: true if L; =: P for some 1 � i � n, with the 
class of truth assignments v' in which v'(P) =:false if 
L; = -,p for some 1 � i � n. Since the correspon­
dence between syntactic paths and possible truth as­
signments is one-to-many, a search through the former 
space will generally be completed more quickly than 
a truth-table style examination of the latter. Also, 
within a particular matrix, each path of a given length 
will contain roughly the same number of different liter­
als, and so will correspond to approximately the same 
number of truth assignments. Thus, the interpreta­
tion of the portion of the search space explored can 
be extended from the semantic space of truth assign­
ments to the syntactic domain of paths explored in the 
matrix method. 
During matrix theorem proving, if a contradiction is 
produced by adding a literal L; from a clause num­
bered nj to the current subpath, when that already 
contains an occurrence of •L;, the number of paths 
of the total initial search space mn that have already 
been searched is incremented by an additional m(n-n1) 
paths; this is the number of complete paths contain­
ing this subpath. By recording the occurrences of such 
path closings, we can track the frequency of closings 
as a function of the portion of the total search space 
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visited and record probabilistic information about the 
search space explored before an open path is discov­
ered by the reasoner. We use such search information 
to compute the probability of truth before a proof is 
completed. 
Assume that w represents the metatheoretic claim that 
a conclusion follows from the cited premises. We wish 
to compute the probability that the matrix method 
will determine the truth of w, given information that 
some portion of total search space has been explored 
without discovery of an open path. We condition our 
analysis on the absence of a logical proof. We will use 
S to indicate the portion of the total search space that 
has been explored without finding a proof of w. We 
can compute the probability of w by employing Bayes' 
rule to relate the probability that w is true to evidence 
about the progress of search and the prior probability 
of truth, 
p(Siw, �)p( wl�) 
(2) p(Siw, Op(wl�) + p(SI•w, �)p(•wl�) 
where p( wiS, �) is the likelihood of the truth of the 
metatheoretic claim w, given that S of the search space 
has been explored without discovering an open path, 
and background (implicit) information about the sit­
uation ( The term p(Siw, �) is the probability of S 
given w is true, p(SI•w, �) is the probability of S given 
w is false, and p( w I�) is the prior probability that w is 
true. The prior probability of w is based on experience 
with a set of queries to a theorem prover, conditioned 
on such information as the source, size, and structure 
of the input. The probability that w is false, p(•wl�), 
is simply the complement of the prior probability of 
w, 1 - p(•wlx). 
We can simplify Equation 2 by noting that, when w 
is true, no open paths can be found, and the theorem 
prover will search the entire space before halting. Thus 
for all fractions of the search less than one, p(Siw, �) = 
1. Now, we can express p(wiS, �) in terms of p(wl�) 
and p(SI·w, O, 
p(wl�) p( wiS, �) = p( wl�) + p(SI•w, �)[1- p( wl�)] (3) 
Thus, we can compute the truth of a proposition before 
a theorem prover halts if we know the prior probability 
of the truth of w and the probability that search will 
explore increasing portions of the total search space 
without finding a proof that w is false, given that w is 
indeed false. 
What can we say about the expected form of the 
probability distribution p(SI•w, �)? In the absence of 
problem-specific information, we assert event equiva­
lence regarding the likelihood that each possible truth 
assignment for the set of literals appearing in the prob­
lem will satisfy the members of ( P 1\ •C). Event equiv­
alence implies that each of the 2k possible truth as­
signments is equally likely to be consistent with •w. 
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Assume that each path in the search space is indepen­
dent of other paths and that there are () open paths in 
the matrix. The probability of not finding a proof of 
•w after searching portion s of the total search space 
IS, 
(4) 
where mn is the total number of paths in the ma­
trix. In this paper, we shall not demonstrate the ex­
plicit use of such information as the expected number 
of open paths 0. Rather, we show how data about 
p(SI•w, e) can be employed directly. However, in the 
general case, we can seek from data the probability dis­
tribution over the number of open paths as a function 
of such distinctions as the size of the space of truth as­
signments, conditioned on the nature and source of 
the problem instance. Factors, including the num­
ber of clauses, clause length, and size of alphabet can 
contribute to the number of open paths. We can ac­
count for uncertainty in the number of open paths by 
modifying Equation 4 to consider a probability distri­
bution, p(Oih .. . In,e), representing information about 
the number of open paths conditioned on problem­
instance attributes, I; . 
We know that paths in a matrix are not independent; 
because of the branching structure of the paths in the 
matrix, paths can share a large subset of ancestors. 
Given a large number of paths, however, we can pose 
an argument for minimal dependency by substituting 
groups of paths for literals for single paths. We group 
together those paths that have a large percentage of 
literals in common, and assume, without additional 
information, that each of these weakly dependent sets 
of paths have an equal chance of containing an open 
path. 
6 EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
We ran a large number of experiments and collected 
data on the relevance of the portion of search space 
explored without finding a proof to the likelihood that 
a proposition is true. Specifically, we collected infor­
mation on the prior probability of truth of w and the 
probability that a search would progress to portions of 
the search space given that w is false, as required for 
determining the truth of w with Equation 3. 
6.1 EXPERIMENTS 
In the experiments, we generated a large set of propo­
sitional clauses as inputs to the theorem prover and it­
erated the matrix algorithm over each. We restricted 
the inputs to a fixed number of clauses and fix the 
numbers of literals in each disjunction. The occur­
rences of path closings were recorded as a function of 
the proportion of the search space explored and the 
fraction of the total search space explored before an 
open path was discovered by the reasoner. We ran a 
large number of cases and used these multiple samples 
to determine the probability that a counterexample to 
the claim of entailment would be found with further 
computation as a function of the portion of the search 
space visited. 
The propositional matrices for the studies were gen­
erated in a straightforward fashion: Each clause is 
restricted to the same number of literals, and each 
literal within a clause is generated randomly. A 
propositional symbol is selected from an alphabet 
of specified size, with the selection procedure be­
ing repeated until a symbol is found that is not 
already present in the current clause. This sym­
bol is then negated with a 0.5 probability. The 
use of such randomly generated propositional clauses 
as a testbed for performance-enhancing heuristics 
has been investigated by [Mitchell et al., 1992] and 
[Selman et al., 1 992]. For a fixed number of literals per 
clause, the ratio of the number of clauses m comprising 
the problem instance to the size a, of the propositional 
alphabet employed is influential in determining the dif­
ficulty that problem instances will pose to automated 
theorem-proving routines. 
If there are a large number of clauses in relation to the 
number of propositions represented in the matrix, the 
matrix will tend to be trivially unsatisfiable; contra­
dictions within the matrix are so plentiful that very 
little processing work need be done to close all of its 
paths. Alternatively, if there are too few clauses, con­
tradictions will be so scarce as to make the location of 
an open path within the matrix a simple matter. In 
a study of varying difficulty of satisfiability problems, 
Mitchell et al. identify the settings likely to produce 
the most challenging problem instances as those which 
tend to generate an equal number of satisfiable and un­
satisfiable collections of clauses [Mitchell et al., 1 992]. 
In our trials, the fraction of unsatisfiable matrices gen­
erated ranged between 0.3-0.6. 
6.2 RESULTS: THEOREM-PROVING 
PROFILES 
Data on theorem-proving behavior was collected by 
running the matrix method on 750 randomly gener­
ated propositional matrices, each containing 20 clauses 
composed of 3 literals apiece. The literals were gen­
erated from a 4-symbol propositional alphabet. We 
found that thirty percent of the matrices tested con­
tained no open paths whatsoever; thus, the prior prob­
ability of p( w I e) for matrices generated for the study 
is 0.3. Figure 3 shows the probability of finding an 
open path as a function of the portion of search space 
visited for cases where w was found to be false. The 
probability of not finding a path as a function of the 
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Figure 3: Experimental results. Probability of find­
ing an open path, given •w, plotted as function of 
the portion of the search space explored (solid line). 
Results are based on 750 randomly generated propo­
sitional matrices, each containing 20 clauses that are 
composed of 3 literals each. Broken line displays re­
sults for identical set of instances after application of 
a presort heuristic. 
space searched, p(SI•w,�) , is just the complement of 
the plotted values. As described earlier, a cumulative 
probability curve with a binomial structure would sug­
gest that the paths in the matrix, or suitable weakly 
dependent groups of paths, are equally likely to be 
open. 
We can use the data gathered in these experiments 
to compute the probability of w before a proof is 
completed. As an example, assume that the theo­
rem prover has proceeded through forty percent of the 
search space. The data shows that p(SI•w, �) = 0.2 
when s = 0.4. Substituting this, and the prior value 
of truth, 0.3, into Equation 3 yields a probability of 
truth given the search, p( wiS, �) = 0.68. 
6.3 ANALYSIS OF HEURISTICS 
Heuristics have played a central role in research on au­
tomated theorem proving. We explored how we could 
use the Bayesian framework to probe the effectiveness 
of heuristics. We investigated the value and proba­
bilistic implications of applying a preording heuristic 
that reorders the literals within a clause based on the 
results of the inspection of the literals in the matrix. 
A detailed discussion of the heuristic is described in 
(Klein and Horvitz, 1994]. 
We performed experiments with a preording heuristic. 
The broken line graphed in Figure 3 shows the proba­
bility of an open path being found for the sorted case, 
for the same set of cases. The curves for the sorted and 
unsorted cases show significant differences. As in the 
example for the unordered case, let us assume that the 
search has proceeded through 0.4 of the search space. 
The data indicates that for the theorem prover using 
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the preorder heuristic p(Siw,�) = 0.08 when S = 0.4. 
Substituting this probability into Equation 3 yields a 
probability of truth given the search, p( wiS, �) = 0.84, 
in contrast to 0.68 for the unordered situation. In 
this case, the theorem prover employing the preorder 
heuristic and associated data would provide stronger 
belief in the truth of w, given an equivalent amount of 
search. 
7 ACTION BEFORE PROOF 
We now move from the realm of belief about truth to 
action in the world. Assume that the expected value 
of an agent's action depends on the truth of a formula 
which we can prove via the matrix method. Making in­
ferences about the probability that an open path exists 
allows an agent using a propositional logic knowledge 
base to take action based on the partial results of in­
complete theorem-proving, rather than being forced to 
wait until the termination of the logical analysis. As 
in other applications of flexible computation methods, 
we move from a traditional ali-or-nothing analysis to 
one considering a spectrum of partial results. 
7.1 IMMEDIATE ACTION AT A 
DEADLINE 
An agent employing a theorem prover should take ac­
tions that maximize its expected utility. To compute 
the expected value of different actions A; in terms of 
the likelihood of the truth of one or more propositional 
formulae, we must consider the utilities of outcomes 
u(A;, wj) , u(A;, •Wj) , for all actions A; and formulae 
Wj, and select the action that maximizes the expected 
utility (EU). Let us assume that the EU of taking ac­
tion A; depends on the truth of multiple formulae, Wj, 
and that the formulae are mutually exclusive. In this 
case, the EU of taking action A; is 
EU(A;) LP(wjiS, �)u(A;, Wj) 
j 
(5) 
For cases where the best action is determined by belief 
in the truth of a single formula w, the best action, A*, 
lS, 
A* arg max(p( wiS, �) (  u(A;, w) - u(A;, •w)) A 
+ u(A;, •w) ] (6) 
For situations where there are only two actions under 
consideration (e.g., A1=FIGHT, A2=FLIGHT) , we can 
summarize the best policy for action by considering the 
relationship of p( wiS, �) to a threshold probability, p*, 
the probability of truth in formula w where the two 
actions have the same expected utility, 
p* = u(A2, •w)- u(A1, •w) (7) 
u(A2, •w) -u(AI, •w) + u(A1, w) -u(A2, w) 
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Figure 4: Decision making about immediate action 
versus continuing to deliberate with a theorem prover. 
To determine the value of deliberation, we compare 
the expected utility of acting imm�diately with the ex­
pected value of the lottery defined by a commitment to 
continue to explore x additional paths, unless a proof 
is found. 
In such binary decision problems, action A1 is the best 
course of action if p( w/S, n is greater than p*; if it is 
less than the threshold probability, action A2 domi­
nates. 
7.2 IMMEDIATE ACTION VERSUS 
INFERENCE 
We now introduce the expected value of computation 
for logical inference with the matrix method, NEVCt. 
This measure allows us to consider the tradeoff be­
tween the cost associated with delayed action and the 
promise of making a better decision with additional 
computation. Assume we have already searched por­
tion S of the search space s without discovering a 
proof. We wish to determine the value of searching 
an additional j paths. 
Figure 4 displays a decision tree for the problem of 
acting immediately versus delaying for additional de­
liberation. If a theorem prover is allowed to investigate 
x additional of paths in the matrix method, two out­
comes are possible: (1) the system will find a proof of 
--,w and will halt, or (2) the system will not halt. If 
the theorem prover does not halt, we update S to S', 
and revise our belief in the truth of w, p( w/S', �) , with 
Equation 3. 
Unfortunately, we may have to pay a penalty for the 
delay associated with search of additional paths. In 
time-critical situations, the utility of one or more out­
comes is dependent on the length of delay before action 
is taken. We can represent time-dependent utilities by 
extending the representation of the utility of an out­
come, employed in Equation 6, to include changes in 
the utility associated with delays t incurred before ac­
tion, u(A;, Wj, t). 
We shall consider the expected utility of exploring an 
additional j paths without discovering a proof. We use 
p( w/S, j, �) to refer to the probability of w given that 
we search another j paths without finding a proof, af­
ter previously searching a portion S of the space. We 
use t(j) to refer to the amount of time required to 
search j paths. We first consider the value of acting 
immediately after searching the j paths without find­
ing a proof. We use U ( S, j) to refer to the expected 
utility of executing the best action after searching j 
additional paths without finding a proof. If we act 
immediately after searching j paths without finding a 
proof, the expected utility of the best action will be 
U(S, j) = 
max(p( w/S, j, �) (  u[A;, w, t(j) ]  - u[A;, --,w, t(j)]) A 
+ u(A;, --,w, t(j) ) ] (8) 
Let us first consider the NEVCz for the decision to 
continue to perform logical inference for a single ad­
ditional path. We must take into consideration the 
probability that the theorem prover will find the next 
path to be open and will halt, and the case where it 
does not halt. We use p(H/S, j, �) , to refer to the prob­
ability that the system will halt on the jth additional 
path explored, concluding then that w is false. The 
NEVCz for a single path is, 
NEVCt(S, 1) = 
p(H/S, 1, �)max u[A;, •w, t(l) ] A 
+ [1- p(H/S, 1, �) ]U(S, 1)- U(S, 0) (9) 
where U(S, 0) refers to the expected utility of imme­
diate action instead of undertaking additional search. 
Given general temporal cost functions, a single-step 
analysis can fail to identify the possibility that there 
will be positive value in computing for longer periods 
of time. Thus, it may be useful to consider the NEVCt 
for searching multiple paths. A formulation of NEVCt 
for arbitrary numbers of future paths x, within the re­
maining search space, considers the probabilities that 
the system will halt at different times before all x re­
maining paths have been explored, 
NEVCt(S, x) = 
X 
LP(H/S, j, �) mlxu[A;, •w, t(j) ]  
j=l 
+ [1-�p(HIS, j, e)] U(S, j) -U(S, O) (10) 
For a binary decision problem, the maximizations in­
dicated in the equation can be performed simply by 
checking to see if the probability p( w/S, �) is greater 
or less than p*. 
We can acquire the probability distributions necessary 
to solve Equations 9 and 10 directly from the data col­
lected about the performance of the theorem prover as 
described in Section 5. However, we can also employ 
probability models that explain the relationships seen 
in the data, as we described with Equation 4. In par­
ticular, we can approximate the probability of halt­
ing on the jth new path searched. When w is true, 
the probability of halting on any of the j additional 
branches of the search before completing the search, 
p(Hiw,S,j,e), is zero; when w is true, the theorem 
prover will not halt until exhausting the entire space. 
Thus, we need only to consider the probability of halt­
ing for the case where w is false, 
p(HIS, j, e)= p(Hi•w, S, j, e)p(•wiS, j, e) (11) 
If we make similar assertions of independence as those 
assumed in formulating the probability model in Equa­
tion 4, the first term of Equation 11 can be approxi­
mated as, 
[ 0 ]j-2 0 p(HI•w, S,j,e) � 1_ (j + 1) g 1- 1_ i (12) 
assuming we search j additional paths, leaving l paths 
of the total search space unexplored. The probability 
p( •wiS, j, 0 can be computed with Bayes' theorem as 
described in Equation 3. 
8 OPPORTUNITIES IN 
FIRST-ORDER LOGIC 
We have investigated theorem proving with a proposi­
tional language. Applications of theorem proving may 
require a more expressive first-order language (FOL). 
We can extend the matrix method to a domain of 
first-order clauses with ease. However, a first-order 
language introduces complications for the interpreta­
tion of the search space explored as the probability of 
truth. With FOL, it is difficult to deterministically 
analyze the size of the search space, and to determine 
or approximate the ratio of search space explored to 
remaining search space. Indeed, the size of the FOL 
search space is unstable as the space can continue to 
expand because of instantiation during the processing 
of a matrix. Difficulty with the a priori assessment 
of the size of the search space introduces difficulties 
with determining the fraction of the total search space 
explored, and with harnessing information about the 
progress through the space to compute the probability 
that a conclusion must follow from premises. 
We believe the extension of decision-making methods 
to FOL will be a challenging and promising area re­
search area. Several methods may be employed to ex­
tract useful information about the probability of truth 
in first-order logic. These include the use of a prob­
abilistic analysis of the size of the search space, and 
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portion of search space explored, conditioned on evi­
dence about the problem instance and on information 
gleaned during preprocessing and search. The prob­
abilistic and decision-theoretic analyses described in 
this paper can be extended with probability distribu­
tions over these quantities. Additional theoretical and 
empirical studies may reveal approaches to gaining ac­
cess to such probability distributions over the size of 
the search space size. 
9 SUMMARY 
We reviewed related work on flexible computation and 
control of deliberation for computing beliefs and ac­
tions under bounded resources. We took a decision­
making perspective on theorem proving, focusing on 
the use of theorem-proving activity to guide decisions 
about additional deliberation and about actions in the 
world. We hope that this work provides a valuable 
conceptual bridge between theorem proving under lim­
ited computational resources and probabilistic reason­
ing. We foresee research on probabilistic methods for 
tackling problems with the analogous analysis of FOL 
theorem proving. In particular, probabilistic methods 
may prove useful for inducing the expected size of a 
search space generated during FOL theorem proving, 
and for harnessing information about the progress of a 
theorem proving system through the search space with 
continuing computation. 
Acknowledgments 
We thank Jack Breese, Johann Dekleer, David Heck­
erman, Paul Lehner, Sheila Mcllraith, Olivier Raiman, 
and Dave Smith for useful comments and suggestions 
on this work. 
References 
[Bibel, 1987) Bibel, W. (1987). Automated Theorem 
Proving. Braunschweig: Vieweg, Reading, Mas­
sachusetts. 
[Boddy and Dean, 1989) Boddy, M. and Dean, T. 
( 1989). Solving time-dependent planning prob-
lems. In Proceedings of the Eleventh IJCAI. 
AAAI/International Joint Conferences on Artificial 
Intelligence. 
[Dean and Boddy, 1988) Dean, T. and Boddy, M. 
(1988). An analysis of time-dependent planning. 
In Proceedings AAAI-88 Seventh National Confer­
ence on Artificial Intelligence, pages 49-54. Ameri­
can Association for Artificial Intelligence. 
[Dean and Wellman, 1991) Dean, T. and Wellman, M. 
(1991). Planning and Control, chapter 8.3 Tem­
porally Flexible Inference, pages 353-363. Morgan 
Kaufmann Publishers, San Mateo, California. 
314 Horvitz and Klein 
[Doyle, 1990] Doyle, J. (1990). Rationality and its 
roles in reasoning. In Proceedings of the Eigth Na­
tional Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 
1093-1100. American Association for Artificial In­
telligence, AAAI Press I The MIT Press, Cam­
bridge, MA. 
[Frisch and Haddawy, 1995] Frisch, A. and Haddawy, 
P. (1995). Anytime deduction for probabilistic logic. 
Artificial Intelligence. 
[Good, 1952] Good, I. (1952). Rational decisions. J. 
R. Statist. Soc. B, 14:107-114. 
[Horvitz, 1987] Horvitz, E. (1987). Reasoning about 
beliefs and actions under computational resource 
constraints. In Proceedings of Third Workshop on 
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pages 429-
444, Seattle, Washington. American Association for 
Artificial Intelligence. Also in L. Kanal, T. Levitt, 
and J. Lemmer, ed., Uncertainty in Artificial Intel­
ligence 3, Elsevier, 1989, pps. 301-324. 
[Horvitz, 1988] Horvitz, E. (1988). Reasoning under 
varying and uncertain resource constraints. In Pro­
ceedings AAAI-88 Seventh National Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence, Minneapolis, MN, pages 111-
116. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA. 
[Horvitz, 1989] Horvitz, E. (1989). Rational metar­
easoning and compilation for optimizing decisions 
under bounded resources. In Proceedings of Com­
putational Intelligence 89, Milan, Italy. Association 
for Computing Machinery. Available as Technical 
Report KSL-89-81 Computer Science, Stanford Uni­
versity, April 1989. 
[Horvitz, 1990] Horvitz, E. (1990). Computation and 
Action Under Bounded Resources. PhD thesis, Stan­
ford University. 
[Horvitz et al., 1989] Horvitz, E., Cooper, G., and 
Heckerman, D. (1989). Reflection and action un­
der scarce resources: Theoretical principles and em­
pirical study. In Proceedings of the Eleventh Inter­
national Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 
Detroit, MI, pages 1121-1127. International Joint 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 
[Horvitz and Rutledge, 1991] Horvitz, E. and Rut­
ledge, G. (1991). Time-dependent utility and action 
under uncertainty. In Proceedings of Seventh Con­
ference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, Los 
Angeles, CA, pages 151-158. Morgan Kaufman, San 
Mateo, CA. 
[Klein and Horvitz, 1994] Klein, A. and Horvitz, E. 
( 1994). Partial proofs and probability. In Proceed­
ings of the Fifth Workshop on Principles of Diag­
nosis, New Paltz, NY, pages 153-159. Principles of 
Diagnosis. 
[Mitchell et al., 1992] Mitchell, D. G., Selman, B., 
and Levesque, H. (1992). Hard and easy distribu­
tions of SAT problems. In Proceedings of the Tenth 
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 
440-446. American Association for Artificial Intel­
ligence, AAAI Press I The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
[Pittarelli, 1994] Pittarelli, M. (1994). Anytime deci­
sion making with imprecise probabilities. In Pro­
ceedings of Tenth Conference on Uncertainty in Ar­
tificial Intelligence, Seattle, WA, pages 470-477. 
Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo CA. 
[Polya, 1954a] Polya, G. (1954a). Mathematics and 
Plausible Reasoning: Induction and analogy in 
mathematics, vol. 1. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey. 
[Polya, 1954b] Polya, G. (1954b). Mathematics and 
Plausible Reasoning: Patterns of Plausible Infer­
ence, vol. 2. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey. 
[Russell, 1990] Russell, S. (1990). Fine-grained 
decision-theoretic search control. In Proceedings of 
Sixth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial In­
telligence, Cambridge, MA. Association for Uncer­
tainty in Artificial Intelligence, Mountain View, CA. 
[Russell et al., 1993] Russell, S., Subramanian, D., 
and Parr, R. ( 1993). Provable bounded optimal 
agents. In Proceedings of the Thirteenth Interna­
tional Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 
Chambery, France, pages 338-344. International 
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. 
[Selman et al., 1992] Selman, B., Levesque, H., and 
Mitchell, D. (1992). A new method for solving hard 
satisfiability problems. In Proceedings of the Tenth 
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 
459-465. American Association for Artificial Intelli­
gence, AAAI Press, Cambridge, MA. 
[van der Poorten, 1995a] van der Poorten, A. (1995a). 
Notes on Fermat's Last Theorem. Wiley Inter­
science, New York. 
[van der Poorten, 1995b] van der Poorten, A. (1995b). 
Personal communication. Comments on strong be­
lief about truth of Fermat's last theorem before 
proof available. 
